Safety¶
ISO 26262 Safety Element out of Context (SEooC) safety concept for taktora. Sketch-level coverage: assumed item, illustrative HARA, two assumed safety goals, five assumed functional safety requirements (AFSRs), ten technical safety requirements (TSRs) allocated to taktora’s existing crates, the Freedom From Interference argument spanning spatial / temporal / information-exchange categories, and the nine-item Assumption-of-Use (AoU) contract with the integrator.
ASIL capability: ASIL D, claimed via ISO 26262-9 §5 decomposition
ASIL D = ASIL B(D) + ASIL B(D). Taktora is Element A at ASIL B(D);
the integrator supplies a diverse independent monitor as Element B
at ASIL B(D). The independence argument is claimed but not closed by
taktora — closure is an AoU on the integrator.
How to read this section:
Start with Assumed Item — what taktora-hosted item we assume.
Read Assumed HARA — Hazards and Safety Goals — assumed hazards and the safety goals they drive.
Read ASIL Decomposition — how we get to ASIL D.
Read Functional Safety Concept — Assumed FSRs for the assumed functional safety requirements, then Technical Safety Concept — TSRs for the refinement onto taktora’s crates.
Read Freedom From Interference Argument for the Freedom From Interference argument.
Read Assumptions of Use for what the integrator MUST validate.
Architecture decisions supporting this concept (ADR_0050, ADR_0051) live in Safety architecture decisions under the architecture tree.
Safety concept
Safety artefacts at a glance¶
ID |
Title |
Status |
Asil |
|---|---|---|---|
Loss of cyclic safety-critical command |
assumed |
D |
|
Erroneous safety-critical command |
assumed |
D |
ID |
Title |
Status |
Asil |
|---|---|---|---|
Prevent unintended termination of the safety-critical cyclic computation |
assumed |
D |
|
Prevent silent corruption of safety-critical input/output data |
assumed |
D |
ID |
Title |
Status |
Asil |
Refines |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Spatial Freedom From Interference between integrity levels |
assumed |
B(D) |
||
Directional channel topology |
assumed |
B(D) |
||
Per-integrity-level allocation isolation |
assumed |
B(D) |
||
Internal fault detection and propagation |
assumed |
B(D) |
||
Startup integrity verification |
assumed |
B(D) |
ID |
Title |
Status |
Asil |
Refines |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Bounded allocator hard caps |
implemented |
B(D) |
||
Per-integrity-level allocation quotas |
draft |
B(D) |
||
Integrity-level declaration and process isolation |
draft |
B(D) |
||
Missed-deadline detection within one cycle |
implemented |
B(D) |
||
Compile-time channel directionality |
implemented |
B(D) |
||
Bounded health-event latency |
implemented |
B(D) |
||
Single-publisher iceoryx2 topology for safety-critical channels |
implemented |
B(D) |
||
Envelope sequence + CRC integrity |
draft |
B(D) |
||
Cross-process hosting mode |
draft |
B(D) |
||
Heartbeat for Element B monitor |
draft |
B(D) |
ID |
Title |
Status |
|---|---|---|
Diverse Element B monitor at ASIL B(D) |
open |
|
Independence between Element A and Element B |
open |
|
Heartbeat receiver and safe-state path |
open |
|
Host OS provides MMU isolation and deterministic scheduling |
open |
|
Real-time scheduling and CPU pinning for SC process |
open |
|
Integrator confirms HARA inputs and FTTI |
open |
|
Integrator owns safe-state semantics |
open |
|
Integrator unsafe-Rust discipline |
open |
|
Lower-stack qualification at ASIL B(D) |
open |